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GILES V. CALIFORNIA: AVOIDING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO 
CRAWFORD’S LIMITED REVOLUTION 
by  
Robert P. Mosteller* 
This Article endorses the result in Giles v. California, which limited the 
reach of the forfeiture through wrongdoing exception to those instances 
where “the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness 
from testifying.” Largely for practical and policy reasons, I find this 
result important and proper. Given the apparently limited coverage of 
out-of-court statements by the confrontation doctrine under the 
testimonial statement approach, expansive application of the forfeiture 
doctrine could have gutted much of its already restricted protection.  
I also briefly sketch where I believe the new confrontation doctrine that 
Crawford v. Washington produced stands in protecting the rights of 
defendants against problematic hearsay statements. My judgment is that 
these developments have been important and largely positive but limited 
in impact. Moreover, the mini-revolution that Crawford spawned 
appears to have largely run its course, and the more recent decision of the 
Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts which concluded that 
forensic certificates are testimonial, does not change that assessment. 
Finally, Giles adds further evidence of the limited power of originalism 
to determine specific applications for the Confrontation Clause doctrine 
in a modern world that differs, both in legal structure and values, from 
the Framing era. Fortunately, the splintered decisions and analysis 
suggest that this misguided approach is losing its hold on the Court’s 
confrontation analysis and that pragmatic and policy concerns may play 
a stronger role on future developments in this area.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Washington has been accurately described as revolutionary.1 As time 
passes, however, my sense is that it is more revolutionary in analytical 
method than in changed outcomes affording greater confrontation 
protection to defendants when the prosecution offers hearsay against 
them. I do not want to denigrate Crawford’s significant impact. Clearly, 
protection in some extremely problematic areas, such as statements by 
criminal co-participants taken in police custody that incriminate both the 
person making the statement and the defendant, is markedly improved, 
and those statements are now uniformly excluded by Crawford’s clear 
command absent confrontation. As to such statements and statements of 
witnesses to the police about past crimes, excluded by Davis v. 
Washington, the accused now has real protection.2 
Nevertheless, I view the Confrontation Clause rulings under the 
“testimonial statement” approach sketched so far by the Supreme Court 
with a sense of regret. They appear to have left many unreliable, 
incriminating, and accusatory hearsay statements offered against a 
criminal defendant admissible and unregulated, despite the complete 
absence of confrontation.3 As far as the results are concerned, rather 
than the analysis, most rulings under the testimonial statement approach 
are largely the same as they were under the vanquished system of Ohio v. 
Roberts, which admitted most hearsay and did so through an easily 
satisfied reliability assessment rather than requiring confrontation.4 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
3 Of course, those who find Crawford’s testimonial approach clearly correct will 
respond that the Framers meant that none of these unreliable, incriminating, and 
accusatory statements should be covered by the Clause. I remain unconvinced that 
the Court’s approach, which is certainly a plausible construction, applied in the 
narrow fashion that its decisions permit and the lower courts have generally 
employed, captures either the true meaning or the full power of the Sixth 
Amendment’s right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. I continue to hope that a more robust approach will be 
embraced that broadens the scope of protection and encourages confrontation of 
available declarants. 
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980). An example of how under Crawford results have changed as 
to one class of statements but remained the same for others as they were under 
Roberts can be seen in cases involving children. The lower courts with a relatively high 
degree of uniformity exclude statements made by children to police officers, which 
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Although the new doctrine and its reach have not been fully spelled out, 
an outline of much of its perimeter appears to have taken shape.5 Rather 
than producing a substantive revolution barring admission of 
unconfronted hearsay against the accused or producing more actual 
confrontation, Crawford presently appears to have been somewhat more 
of a fascinating paradigm shift in analysis that produces largely the same 
outcomes. 
This Article has two major components and a new installment of an 
earlier made point. The first major Part sketches out roughly where the 
new confrontation doctrine stands as a protector of the accused against 
unconfronted hearsay. As stated above, my judgment is that the 
are virtually always made after an emergency has ended, but admit similar statements 
with regard to their accusatory content made to family members, teachers, and 
medical personnel. See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and 
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 944–50 
(2007) [hereinafter Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation]. See also id. at 937–43 
(noting that the Supreme Court suggested these different results as to virtually 
identical accusatory statements in Crawford where it suggested that the decision in 
White v. Illinois, may have been in error but noting only the statement made to “an 
investigating police officer”). White, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Indeed, in Whorton v. 
Bockting, the Court ruled that the testimonial statement approach offered even less 
protection than Roberts, freeing unreliable nontestimonial statements from any 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. Whorton, 549 U.S. 406, 419–20 (2007). See discussion 
infra note 6. 
5 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the Court held that 
forensic certificates prepared by government laboratories that established that the 
white powder possessed by the defendant was cocaine was testimonial and required 
the testimony of an analyst. How that case fits into this pattern of a serviceable but 
constrained doctrine is a little more difficult to assess, and its long-term impact on 
development of the doctrine is somewhat uncertain. Although Justice Scalia may have 
overstated the simplicity of the analysis given the strident disagreement of the dissent, 
he appeared largely accurate in terms of the logic of the testimonial approach in 
stating that “[t]his case involves little more than the application of our holding in 
Crawford.” Id. at 2542 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).  
 The certificates at issue were formal documents that stated that the substance 
found in the defendant’s possession was cocaine, which is the precise testimony the 
analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. Id. at 2532. Melendez-Diaz is 
firm in its resolution that forensic certificates prepared by government laboratories 
are testimonial, which has important practical consequences for how the government 
must prove its case when such evidence is involved, but there are suggestions that the 
victory is precarious and could prove to be a narrow one. The case was decided by a 
five-to-four vote, and Justice Kennedy’s dissent voiced some skepticism of the entire 
testimonial concept in his protest that “[t]he Court’s reliance on the word 
‘testimonial’ is of little help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of 
the Clause.” Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Finally, the Court quickly granted 
certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia, to examine the constitutionality of procedural 
limitations that may be imposed on the confrontation promised by Melendez-Diaz. 
Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). With the exception of Justice Scalia, its architect, the 
testimonial approach appears no longer to provide a broad animating mandate for 
the Court. The impact of Melendez-Diaz is not fully known, but its extension of the 
logic of the testimonial approach to forensic certificates does not promise an 
expansive reach to the testimonial doctrine. 
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developments have been important and largely positive, but limited. 
Moreover, it appears that the mini-revolution has basically run its course.  
The second major Part of the Article examines and endorses the 
result in Giles v. California, which limited the reach of the forfeiture 
through wrongdoing exception to those instances in which “the 
defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from 
testifying.”6 Largely for practical and policy reasons, I find this result 
important and proper. Given the apparently limited coverage of out-of-
court statements by the confrontation doctrine under the testimonial 
statement approach, expansive application of the forfeiture doctrine 
could have gutted much of its already restricted protection.7  
The Justices’ disagreement regarding analysis of Framing-era case-
law adds a sub point that further illustrates my argument that originalism 
has limited power to point to, let alone mandate, specific applications for 
the Confrontation Clause in a modern world that differs both in legal 
structure and values. Of course, constitutional text and the history of the 
hearsay rule, its exceptions, and what that history might tell us about the 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause are points from which all 
who would speak to the proper scope of the right should take guidance. I 
believe we have once again seen that much interpretation is required 
from meager sources to determine what the state of the common law was, 
and this is just the first step.8 The task, which is to determine what the 
legal history should mean for modern practice, becomes even more 
conceptually difficult.9 Perhaps broad outlines are discernable through 
6 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008) (describing the scope of the common law 
forfeiture rule). 
7 In addition, the Confrontation Clause now has no application to statements not 
considered testimonial. In Whorton, the Court stated: “[u]nder Roberts, an out-of-court 
nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be 
admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on 
the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and 
therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.” Whorton, 549 
U.S. at 420 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56). Thus, the statements excluded by the 
Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, would now likely no longer be examined at all 
under the Confrontation Clause. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). See generally Robert P. 
Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not 
Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 722 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller, 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure] (noting that Wright is quite likely no longer viable as 
a Confrontation Clause case because the statements would be considered 
nontestimonial, and that generally, the area of statements by children was one of the 
few situations where the reliability analysis of Roberts had resulted in the exclusion of 
unconfronted hearsay). 
8 See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 923–33 (discussing the 
difficulty of knowing what the Framers knew regarding English cases decided prior to 
the enactment of the Confrontation Clause but only available in America in their 
present form long afterward).  
9 See Mosteller, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 7, at 718–22 
(discussing the difficulty of knowing and translating history into application in a very 
different environment). 
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this process, but specific results rarely can be determined by originalism. 
Instead, I believe it is usually an indirect form of value selection couched 
in the choice of historical construction of hearsay law. 
One certainly finds discord in the multiple opinions in Giles and 
some evidence of frustration with the delegation of important policy 
issues to case analysis of a distant and only vaguely perceived age. The 
hopeful sign in these disparate opinions is that that the Confrontation 
Clause may in the future be shaped more directly by considerations of 
policy and doctrinal prudence.  
II. THE COVERAGE AND IMPACT OF
CRAWFORD’S TESTIMONIAL CONCEPT
In contrast to Ohio v. Roberts, which provided protection that was 
figuratively “a mile wide and an inch deep,” Crawford establishes 
protection that is deep but apparently narrow. It provides real bite to the 
hearsay that it defines as covered by the Confrontation Clause, which are 
“testimonial” statements. If such hearsay has not been subject to 
confrontation in some earlier trial or trial-like hearing, or if the person 
who made the statement is not presently subject to confrontation, then it 
is excluded unless it falls within one of a quite limited number of 
exceptions.  
The chief limiting factor on the scope of Crawford’s reach is not 
whether it falls within an exception, because the exceptions are generally 
narrow. Rather, the limitation primarily flows from the apparently 
restrictive nature of the “testimonial” concept as that term is being 
developed by the Court. Even though an incriminating, unconfronted 
statement is offered to convict the defendant, it is not covered at all by 
the Confrontation Clause unless the statement is deemed testimonial. 
To date, the Court has held that two types of statements are 
definitely testimonial. First, in Crawford, it held that statements by co-
participants in a crime made to the police in response to interrogation 
and while in custody are testimonial. Second, in Davis v. Washington, the 
Court ruled that statements made to the police in the field are 
testimonial if they concern past events and are not made during an 
ongoing emergency.10 Davis also eliminated a number of possible 
formalistic requirements of Crawford, concluding that a testimonial 
statement need not be made while the witness is in custody,11 or in 
10 547 U.S. 813 (2006). I mean generally to describe here the second category of 
statements within Confrontation Clause protection but without using the Court’s 
technical detail, which requires that “the primary purpose of the interrogation [must 
be] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.” Id. at 822. 
11 Id. at 830 (concluding the statement made by Amy Hammon to the police was 
formal enough even though not made after Miranda warnings at the station house). 
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response to police questioning,12 and it need not be embodied in a 
witness statement, but could be contained in officer notes or memory.13 
However, the Davis Court did unequivocally state that “formality is . . . 
essential to testimonial utterance.”14 Specifically, it concluded that “It 
imports sufficient formality . . . that lies to [police] officers are criminal 
offenses.”15  
Although the issues have not been clearly addressed, the apparent 
direction of the Supreme Court is toward application of the 
Confrontation Clause primarily to statements made to investigative 
agents, likely with few exceptions. Statements of co-conspirators are not 
covered by the testimonial concept because they must be made “in 
furtherance of the conspiracy” and therefore “would probably never 
be . . . testimonial.”16 Most business records clearly are not covered for 
similar reasons because their general purpose is not the production of 
testimony.17 
In Giles, Justice Scalia stated that “[s]tatements to friends and 
neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in 
the course of receiving treatment” would not be covered by the 
testimonial concept.18 The sweep of Scalia’s statement may have been 
slightly too broad, but it reveals how the prime architect of the new 
Confrontation Clause doctrine presumes the law will develop. Crawford 
12 Id. at 822 n.1 (“The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-
examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they 
were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”). 
13 Id. at 826 (concluding that the confrontation right could not be evaded by 
having a “note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the 
declarant” rather than presenting it in formal written statement form, and that the 
clause covered both a “writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory 
(and perhaps notes) of [a police] officer”). 
14 Id. at 830 n.5.  
15 Id. at 831 n.5; See also id. at 826–27 (“The solemnity of even an oral declaration 
of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well enough established by the severe 
consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.” (citing examples of federal and 
state criminal punishment for false statements to investigators)); Robert P. Mosteller, 
Softening the Formality and Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 429 (2007) (discussing generally the effect of Davis to reduce the rigidity of
the testimonial concept, certainly as suggested by the definition taken from Justice
Thomas’s concurring decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring)).
16 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008).  
17 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2009) (“Business 
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they 
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created 
for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their 
nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.”). 
18 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692–93. 
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suggests that statements to friends and neighbors typically would not be 
covered because they were not made with any thought to being used in 
court,19 and Davis further suggests that in most situations, they also lack 
the formality required of testimonial statements.20 Statements to doctors 
in the course of receiving treatment would not be covered by the 
testimonial statement concept because “the primary purpose of the 
interrogation” is not “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution,”21 and many of them lack formality.22 
Of course, statements should be testimonial in some situations even 
if not made to investigative officers, but those will likely be extremely 
rare. One group would be “technically informal statements when used to 
evade the formalized process.”23 Another relatively clear group, albeit 
likely a small one, would include written statements, which would possess 
the formality of the written form, given, for example, to a friend or 
neighbor with instructions that they be delivered to police investigators if 
anything should happen to the author.24 Certainly some issues remain to 
be resolved regarding the circumstances that produce testimonial 
statements, but the numerous signals appear to point in a consistent 
direction: few statements, but clearly a few, will be found to be 
testimonial if made to persons other than police investigators. 
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not.”). 
20 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
21 Id. In order to be testimonial, investigating a possible crime does not have to 
be the exclusive purpose of the police obtaining the statement; “[o]bjectively viewed, 
[it must be] the primary, if not . . . the sole, purpose of the interrogation.” Id. at 830.  
 Whether Davis shifted the focus to the purpose of the questioner rather than the 
intent of the speaker is unclear, but it is clearly suggested by the Court’s language. See 
Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4 at 918–19, 938, 942–43, 947 
(discussing the apparent shift of focus from Crawford, where the intent of the speaker 
was clearly dominant, to Davis, which appears to shift the focus to the intent of the 
questioner, and the impact of such a shift to the analysis of cases involving children). 
22 See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a victim’s statement 
is not ‘testimonial,’ perhaps because she made it to a nurse, the statement could 
come into evidence under this rule. But where the statement is made formally to a 
police officer, the majority’s rule would keep it out. Again this incongruity arises in 
part because of pre-existing confrontation-related rules.” (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 
830 n. 5 (“[F]ormality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance.”))). 
23 Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although the majority did not 
explicitly embrace this formulation, its discussion indicates it would obviously adopt 
at least that much of an extension. Id. at 830 n.5. Concrete examples of such evasive 
statements are not clear to me, but the concept might cover a government official 
suggesting that a witness make statements to private citizens or preserve them in a 
personal document.  
24 See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 521, 527–28 (Wis. 2007) (concluding 
that written statements made by a murder victim to be delivered by a neighbor to the 
police if anything happened to her were testimonial). 
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In the child abuse area, I have identified a class of statements that 
should be somewhat problematic for courts to categorize and should be 
difficult to treat as uniformly nontestimonial using dispassionate analysis. 
They are mechanically recorded statements, typically videotaped 
interviews, made by children regarding alleged child abuse.25 They 
obviously have the necessary formality. When those statements are made 
to a trained forensic interviewer for the sole purpose of prosecution, they 
are typically found to be testimonial by the trial court.26 However, most 
statements are not single-purpose statements taken to aid the 
prosecution, but rather they serve multiple purposes. Moreover, if the 
recording is currently made exclusively for prosecution purposes, 
knowledgeable and sophisticated abuse investigative efforts presumably 
will change their practices once they recognize that the statement will be 
excluded if it remains a single-purpose statement. They may adopt, for 
example, medically oriented questioning protocols and/or utilize 
medical personnel to conduct the questioning. That will produce either 
mixed purpose statements, whose testimonial status is subject to judicial 
characterization, or statements that primarily serve a medical purpose 
rather than a prosecutorial one, which are automatically freed from 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 
I predict that the end result will turn out to be relatively clear and 
consistent despite the uncertain character of some of these statements 
with regard to whether they rightfully should be within the protection of 
the Confrontation Clause. The key inquiry will be a factual one by the 
trial judge to determine the primary purpose of the questioning. That 
purpose may arguably be found to be medical in most situations despite 
creating highly effective evidence for the prosecution if jurisdictions 
structure the interview with a medical orientation. As a result, I suspect 
that the trend in future cases will be for trial courts to find most such 
recordings nontestimonial.27 These videotapes will be admissible without 
any requirement of confrontation as very effective accusatory evidence in 
the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator. Therefore, few of 
those mechanically recorded statements will be protected by the 
Confrontation Clause, and all that will be needed for admission of the 
videotaped statement is an applicable hearsay exception. The result 
25 See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4 at 965–75 (discussing 
statements that are typically videotaped and made for a variety of purposes).  
26 See id. at 963–65 (finding such statement the functional equivalent of police 
interrogation). In In re Rolandis G., the Supreme Court of Illinois found that although 
the statement was taken by a child advocacy center interviewer as part of an 
interdisciplinary approach to the investigation of child sexual abuse, the objective 
evidence showed it was conducted at the behest of the police to gather evidence for 
prosecution. 902 N.E.2d 600, 613 (Ill. 2008). 
27 See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641–43 (Minn. 2007) (concluding 
that multipurpose videotaped statement was not testimonial, despite the assessment 
being a joint decision of social services and law enforcement, where the court found 
the primary purpose of the interview was the child’s health and welfare). 
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under Roberts,28 admission of the statement, would thereby be replicated; 
but the Confrontation Clause interest would have received arguably even 
less protection, with attention given largely to formalisms such as the 
agency for which the person asking the questions worked rather than 
whether it was a questionable out-of-court statement particularly in need 
of testing by cross-examination. 
III. GILES’S FORFEITURE DECISION
As noted earlier, Crawford set out a small number of exceptions to 
the confrontation right for testimonial statements.29 Most of them were 
either limited in scope or effectively guaranteed a form of 
confrontation.30 The only exception denying all confrontation that had 
the capacity to expand elastically is forfeiture through wrongdoing. The 
extent of elasticity depends on how the intent element of the exception 
was interpreted. If intent to silence the witness is not required, I 
suggested that in child abuse cases, the commission of the crime would 
likely be found to be the reason a child was unable to testify. Moreover, if 
the hearsay exception employed to admit the statement does not require 
the declarant’s presence and testimony, the prosecution would have little 
incentive to work to enable the child to take the stand and be a witness as 
opposed to securing testimony of a family member, caseworker, or 
psychologist that the child was unable to testify because of the trauma of 
the offense.31 Forfeiture eliminates incentives to afford the defendant 
with present confrontation when powerful and persuasive hearsay 
statements have been made to non-law-enforcement questioners.  
As I argued,32 and Justice Scalia later observed,33 dispensing with 
confrontation because the trial judge concludes the defendant is guilty 
28 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
29 See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 516 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, 
Confrontation of Witnesses] (listing six exceptions: (1) statements not testimonial in 
nature; (2) testimonial statements which have not been previously confronted but 
where the declarant is available for confrontation at the current trial; (3) statements 
that have previously been confronted and the declarant is presently unavailable; (4) 
forfeiture through wrongdoing; (5) dying declarations (perhaps); and (6) statements 
not used for their truth). 
30 The second and third exceptions listed in the preceding note depend on 
confrontation being satisfied either earlier or presently. 
31 See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 987 (describing the 
process by which the prosecution can help children to be able to testify or can 
develop evidence that they are unavailable because of psychological trauma). 
32 See Richard D. Friedman, et al., Crawford, Davis, & the Right of Confrontation: 
Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 507, 527 (2007). During the panel 
discussion, I observed: “I thought the best rhetorical device of Justice Scalia in 
Crawford was that we do not deny the right to trial by jury because a judge makes the 
decision that the defendant is guilty. Similarly, under forfeiture, you shouldn’t be 
able to deny the right to cross-examination and to confrontation, which might have 
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resembles the obviously ridiculous position that a judge could dispense 
with the entire trial after satisfying herself of the defendant’s guilt. In 
Giles, an interestingly divided Court rejected the California Supreme 
Court’s conclusion that forfeiture of the confrontation right as a 
consequence of the defendant’s wrongdoing did not require an intention 
of the defendant to silence the witness’ testimony. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled that, in murdering his ex-girlfriend, the defendant 
did not forfeit his right to object to a statement she had made to the 
police three weeks before the murder regarding acts of domestic violence 
committed by the defendant and a threat to kill her if he found her 
“cheating” on him.34  
For me, the Supreme Court’s decision to require intent is clearly 
proper because of its practical impact on the Confrontation Clause. 
Without the intent requirement, the protection of the confrontation 
right largely vanishes in whole classes of cases because of factors 
unrelated to the underlying values of the right. It is, of course, possible 
that the Framers meant for the right to be so narrow in scope. However, 
the broad general thrust of the Sixth Amendment in which the right is 
located and the general historical understanding of the purpose of the 
right suggests no such cramped application. Instead, it is a broad 
procedural right that generally guarantees a form of procedure that 
places the jury and adversarial testing between a citizen and denial of 
liberty by criminal prosecution and conviction. 
IV. SOUTER’S PRACTICAL APPROACH
The six-Justice majority in Giles is made up of multiple parts. First, 
Scalia wrote an opinion with Roberts fully concurring. Justices Thomas 
and Alito concurred in separate opinions with Scalia regarding his 
forfeiture analysis.35 However, both Justices concluded that, although the 
issue was not presented by the losing party, the victim’s statement to the 
police was not within the purview of the Confrontation Clause because it 
been the essence of the defendant’s jury trial, because a judge makes exactly the same 
kind of decision but just puts a different legal label on it. . . . 
 “The chief evil of Roberts was its unpredictability and its manipulability. If you 
have a forfeiture doctrine that has those same possibilities, I worry. I know it’s a 
different doctrine, but the practical results are much the same, especially in child 
abuse and domestic violence cases where the alleged crime itself could be argued as 
the reason for the person’s unavailability.” Id. 
33 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (2008) (“The notion that judges may 
strip the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on 
the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does 
not sit well with the right to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to ‘dispensing with 
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.’” (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004))). 
34 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681–82. 
35 Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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was not sufficiently testimonial in that it lacked formality.36 Souter, with 
Ginsburg concurring in his opinion, joined Scalia’s opinion except as to 
one subpart.37  
I found Souter’s opinion to present, perhaps, an element of the 
future of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Souter refused to concur 
in Part II-D-2 of Scalia’s opinion. It is not obvious what precisely Souter 
found objectionable in that part of the opinion. Likely it is Scalia’s 
trashing of the effort by Justice Breyer in his dissent to develop 
Confrontation Clause doctrine based on “policies underlying the 
confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was 
historically understood.”38 
Souter’s opinion seems itself to be based on a somewhat limited 
reverence for history and more on practicality and policy. He indicates at 
one point that he finds what appears to be Scalia’s broad historical 
analysis sound However, at another point, perhaps referring to the 
precise lessons of history for fatally abusive domestic relationships, he 
states that the contrast between Scalia’s and Breyer’s construction of the 
historical record indicates “that the early cases on the exception were not 
calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here.”39 
Overall what motivated Souter to embrace the intent requirement 
was fear of the alternative. He found an insufficient protection in a 
procedural rule that permits the “evidence that the defendant killed [to] 
come in because the defendant probably killed.”40 As he stated, it was this 
36 Thomas referenced his dissenting position in Davis that the statement in the 
Hammon v. Indiana case (the companion case to Davis), which the Court found 
testimonial, lacked the degree of formality that he believed was required. Id. at 2693 
(citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Alito 
took a similar substantive position, but did not explain either how the statement in 
this case differed from the statement in Hammon, where he concurred in the Court’s 
determination that the statement had sufficient formality to be found testimonial. See 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 815 (noting that Alito joined Scalia’s opinion). Although not 
directly announcing their disagreement with the testimonial determination, all other 
members of the Court declined to endorse the statements, which were made to a 
police officer who responded to a domestic violence complaint, as testimonial. Justice 
Scalia’s opinion “accept[ed] without deciding” that the statement was testimonial. 
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. The dissent was somewhat more pointed in its reservation of 
decision on whether the statement was testimonial, stating “It is important to 
underscore that this case is premised on the assumption, not challenged here, that 
the witness’ statements are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. 
at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Whether the Justices other than Thomas and Alito are 
questioning the testimonial character of statements that would appear rather clearly 
testimonial under Davis, or whether they were simply observing that the question was 
not being litigated is unclear. Nevertheless, the potentially restrictive attitude toward 
what should be a settled issue, that the statements were testimonial, is disconcerting. 
37 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
38 Id. at 2691. See also id. (rejecting implicitly the dissent’s reasoning “from the 
‘basic purposes and objectives’ of the forfeiture doctrine”). 
39 Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring). 
40 Id. 
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practical argument for limiting forfeiture “rather than a dispositive 
example from the historical record that persuades me that the Court’s 
conclusion is the right one in this case.”41 Again, he repeated the 
practical and policy influence that went along with the historical record 
in causing him to reach his conclusion:  
[T]he substantial indication that the Sixth Amendment was
meant to require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial 
process before thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation 
right forfeited; otherwise the right would in practical terms boil 
down to a measure of reliable hearsay, a view rejected in 
Crawford . . . .42  
V. THE LIMITS OF ORIGINALISM’S CASE ANALYSIS AS A GUIDE
TO CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION 
I question the capacity of originalism to decide finely tuned issues. I 
begin with Drayton v. Wells,43 a case the majority relies upon to support its 
conclusion,44 but one that I find completely ambiguous and illustrative of 
the reality that claiming there is a settled common law meaning is largely 
an act of creation. The case was decided by the South Carolina Court of 
Constitutional Appeals in 1819, relatively soon after the adoption of the 
Sixth Amendment.45 Justice Scalia cites this case as one of several 
authorities, but a quite limited number, that defined the forfeiture 
doctrine to involve the “contrivance of the opposite party,” which Scalia 
contended at least suggests intentional action meant to prevent the 
witness from testifying.46 
However, the context of Drayton v. Wells seems to me to reveal more 
about the confusion of the common law by our modern standards than it 
tells us anything about the precise issue Scalia was examining. Drayton was 
a civil case, an action of assumpsit, on a verbal agreement between the 
plaintiff and the defendant regarding the plaintiff’s employment as 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 2695. 
43 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 409 (Constitutional Ct. App. 1819). 
44 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684. 
45 Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 409. I wish to thank Professor Collin 
Miller, who brought this case to my attention. 
46 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 411). 
Scalia finds the explicit statement he supports in an 1858 treatise and the failure of 
cases to conclude there was forfeiture in the absence of such intentional action: “An 
1858 treatise made the purpose requirement more explicit still, stating that the 
forfeiture rule applied when a witness ‘had been kept out of the way by the prisoner, 
or by someone on the prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence 
against him . . . .’ E. POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed. 1858) 
(emphasis added). The wrongful-procurement exception was invoked in a manner 
consistent with this definition. We are aware of no case in which the exception was 
invoked although the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a 
witness from testifying, such as offering a bribe.” Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684. 
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overseer of a plantation and the compensation for that service.47 The 
plaintiff prevailed at the initial trial of the matter, but the judgment was 
overturned on appeal.48 At the retrial, the defendant called a witness who 
testified favorably to his position in the first trial, but who had a 
remarkable failure of memory when called as a witness at the retrial.49 He 
testified that he had “totally dismissed the subject from his mind.”50 The 
defendant then sought to introduce evidence in the form of the memory 
of witnesses who observed this testimony at the first trial, but the trial 
judge refused to admit their testimony.51 
The case is thus not about confrontation at all because it was a civil 
case, not a criminal prosecution. Moreover, it was about the rejection of 
the failure of memory as a basis for unavailability applied to prior cross-
examined testimony, not a separate hearsay or Confrontation Clause 
exception that is at issue with forfeiture through wrongdoing in Giles.  
The South Carolina appellate court stated: 
 The books enumerate four cases only, in which the testimony of 
a witness who has been examined in a former trial, between the 
same parties, and where the point in issue was the same, may be 
given in evidence, on a second trial, from the mouths of other 
witnesses, who heard him give evidence: 1st. Where the witness was 
dead. 2nd. Where he was insane. 3rd. Where he was beyond seas; 
and 4th. Where the Court was satisfied the witness had been kept 
away by the contrivance of the opposite party.52 
The court did not tell us what books were examined, but its 
understanding was that forfeiture constituted a basis for unavailability 
under what had to be the hearsay doctrine, along with death, for the 
admission of prior testimony. It is hard to see how this case provides 
much support for Scalia’s position since it lists death as also sufficient for 
the function performed here by “forfeiture.” It is equally difficult to see 
how this case supports the opposite position that forfeiture was at that 
historical moment anything more than an unavailability concept that 
applied to one specific type of hearsay—prior testimony. There is no 
indication that the court understood forfeiture to be a separate ground 
for admission of hearsay or an exception to the confrontation right, 
which was irrelevant to its decision. There is nothing in the opinion 
about any separate understanding that would distinguish hearsay and 
confrontation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if it were my 
47 Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 409. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 410. The turnabout was so dramatic that one might wonder whether 
witness tampering—strict forfeiture conduct—by the plaintiff might have been 
involved. However, apparently the defendant did not think to pursue the issue. Thus, 
neither unavailability through forfeiture nor admission through forfeiture are part of 
the case.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 411. 
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choice, I would not turn the definition of the Confrontation Clause in 
the twenty-first century over to the perhaps mistaken understanding of 
the law by three South Carolina judges two hundred years ago or our 
mistaken interpretation of the meaning of their strange sounding 
analysis. 
Justice Scalia cites several English and American cases that he 
contends demonstrate that the forfeiture doctrine operated at common 
law as a basis for admission of statements that had not been previously 
confronted.53 The number of authorities is hardly impressive to 
demonstrate a clearly developed doctrine rather than either an 
aberration, a mistake, or a reflection of changing historical 
understanding. In reaching its conclusion, Scalia even notes that “the 
case law is sparse.”54 Potentially of critical importance, the only Supreme 
Court decision, Reynolds v. United States,55 involved prior cross-examined 
testimony, but Scalia argues that fact is not significant because the Court 
did not explicitly recognize prior confrontation as a necessary condition 
of the forfeiture exception’s application.56 Obviously, the Supreme Court 
need not make the observation that other preconditions exist to decide 
the question of whether forfeiture occurred, but despite Scalia’s claim in 
Giles, Reynolds seems to have recognized and relied on the existence of 
prior cross-examination.57 
I cannot make a directly contrary claim because the cases Scalia cites 
clearly do exist. What I do contend is that they do not clearly establish a 
strong forfeiture doctrine separate from the forfeiture ground for 
admission of previously confronted statements. In the recent 
Confrontation Clause cases, I believe too much weight is placed on a 
purpose driven reading of authorities of uncertain meaning. Moreover, 
no attention is given to the fact that the hearsay doctrine was changing 
throughout this period with little emphasis placed at times on prior 
confrontation in the sense of cross-examination and at times more on the 
importance of the hearsay being in writing; or that the declarant had 
been under oath or that the accused had been present.58 Also, the cases 
53 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2688–90 (2008) (citing principally 
Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833 (Old Bailey 1692) (statement before coroner); 
Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (statement before grand jury); and 
State v. Lewis, 1 Del Cas. 608 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818) (statement before grand jury)). 
54 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691.  
55 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
56 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2690–91. 
57 As Robert Kry has carefully developed in his contribution to this symposium, 
the Reynolds Court’s description of the case and citations to other authorities indicate 
that it did indeed understand and assume that the prior statement had been subject 
to confrontation. See Robert Kry, Forfeiture and Cross-Examination, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV 577, 600–01 (2009). See also Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161 (“The accused was present at 
the time the testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination. This 
brings the case clearly within the well-established rules.”). 
58 See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine 
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 737–42 
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are treated as if they are all correctly decided under a widely shared 
understanding of the common law hearsay doctrine of that time. This 
approach assumes a type of unerring omniscient understanding among 
jurists, which I do not believe can be accurately claimed for any set of 
judges or courts in modern history. I suspect there is more certainty in 
Justice Scalia’s mind than there was in those of the jurists of the relevant 
period or in the actual status of the historical record rather than his 
construction of it. 
There are two keys to Scalia’s originalist position in Giles. The first is 
his position, initially stated in Crawford and now the central basis for 
shaping the Confrontation Clause application to modern practices: “the 
Confrontation Clause is ‘most naturally read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding.’”59 It does appear, however, that 
Scalia now interprets “is most naturally read” from Crawford to mean “is 
read.” In his view, either the statement was historically treated as hearsay 
requiring confrontation or the Clause is inapplicable, but if applicable, 
the Clause operates absent a recognized historical exception. 
In Giles, he adds a new element that the exceptions he is referring to 
are, of course, hearsay, rather than confrontation, exceptions. He states: 
 No case or treatise that we have found, however, suggested that a 
defendant who committed wrongdoing forfeited his confrontation 
rights but not his hearsay rights. And the distinction would have 
been a surprising one, because courts prior to the founding 
excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was 
unconfronted.60 
This statement makes sense because, before the Bill of Rights was 
adopted, the confrontation concept had no real independent status. This 
acknowledgement is accurate and therefore devastating to Breyer’s 
position that killing a witness automatically forfeits the confrontation 
right. The numerous cases that excluded dying declarations in homicide 
cases where the declarant was insufficiently aware he was about to die 
render untenable the broad position that intent to silence the witness was 
(describing the hearsay doctrine of the late eighteenth century as putting special 
emphasis on the oath and much less significance on cross-examination than was the 
view of the early nineteenth century). The emphasis on the oath could explain the 
admission of the sworn testimony, which was involved certainly in the two grand jury 
cases cited by Scalia and perhaps all three authorities, despite the absence of cross-
examination, and as a result could undercut their power to support a separate 
forfeiture admissibility doctrine as opposed to its use to establish unavailability for 
statements that satisfied a different hearsay doctrine. The primacy of cross-
examination developed somewhat in tandem with the expansion of the role of 
counsel at trial. Id. at 741. 
59 Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 
(2004)). 
60 Id. at 2686. 
690 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:3 
historically understood to be unnecessary.61 And Scalia explicitly and 
correctly interprets this as conclusive historical evidence demonstrating 
that without an intent to silence the witness an intentional killing was 
insufficient under the common law understanding of the Framing period 
to warrant forfeiture.62 If intent was irrelevant, the killing of the declarant 
by itself would have warranted admission under the forfeiture doctrine 
regardless of the declarant’s understanding of death’s certainty and 
nearness.  
Scalia’s recognition that hearsay exceptions at the time of the 
Framing and Confrontation Clause formulation were largely identical is 
substantively an almost necessary position for an originalist. The 
historical materials give us no clear understanding of whatever separate 
meaning the Confrontation Clause was meant to have. The case materials 
only deal with hearsay developments. Because the Framers were silent on 
their intent, one recognizes the indeterminacy of the historical record, or 
relies on common law hearsay doctrine that one constructs from the 
sources, or necessarily moves to a determination of values, policy, and 
practical concerns. It is to those other sources that I have a sense from 
Giles that a number of the Justices are now turning.  
This recognition of the fundamental linkage of the hearsay rule of 
the Framing era and the Confrontation Clause is, it seems to me, 
devastating theoretically to the idea that the Confrontation Clause was 
intended to cover only testimonial statements.63 There was no such 
61 Id. at 2685–86 (citing numerous English and American cases excluding dying 
declarations by the victim implicating the defendant in homicide cases where the 
declarant lacked the required understanding that death was near at hand). 
62 Id. at 2688.  
63 See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope 
of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352–53 (2007). In summary, 
Davies states: “the framing-era authorities indicate that admission of hearsay 
statements would have violated basic principles of common-law criminal evidence. In 
particular, the framing-era sources indicate that the confrontation right itself 
prohibited the use of hearsay statements as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The 
condemnations of hearsay that appeared in prominent and widely used framing-era 
authorities typically recognized that the admission of a hearsay statement would 
deprive the defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine the speaker in the 
presence of the trial jury, and that opportunity to cross-examine was understood to be 
a salient aspect of the confrontation right. Thus, the framing-era sources actually 
suggest that the Framers would not have approved of the hearsay exceptions that 
were later invented because the Framers would have perceived such exceptions to 
violate a defendant’s confrontation right. 
 “Hence, Crawford’s testimonial formulation of the scope of the confrontation 
right does not reflect ‘the Framers’ design.’ Rather, Crawford’s permissive allowance 
of unsworn hearsay is inconsistent with the basic premises that shaped the Framers’ 
understanding of the right. Thus, whatever might be said for or against Crawford’s 
formulation as a matter of contemporary constitutional policy, the fictional character 
of the historical claims made in that opinion constitute further evidence that 
originalism is a defective approach to constitutional decision-making.” Id.  
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concept in common law hearsay doctrine as a testimonial statement 
doctrine. Instead, the common law’s general position was that, whenever 
hearsay was actually recognized, it was excluded absent confrontation. 
Many of the recognized types of hearsay at the time of the Bill of Right’s 
enactment were in documentary form, but not all, and if the theory of 
hearsay exclusion rested on our modern sense of personal confrontation 
and cross-examination, testimonial formalism is not the defining feature 
that might have spurred creation of the Sixth Amendment’s 
confrontation right.64 
Moreover, maintaining the testimonial restriction is to give our 
modern practices over to the accidental state of the law at the time of the 
Framing rather than to the values that the right conveyed in the 
historical period when the amendment was enacted. If the historical 
understanding is imprecise, as I contend it is, positions asserted 
regarding the contours of the historical record will likely reflect value 
judgments that motivate the specific interpretation given to historical 
sources rather than an independent historical reality. 
VI. THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE AND THE CONFRONTATION
DOCTRINE MOVING FORWARD 
Those who supported a broad forfeiture rule, which would have a 
significant effect in homicide, domestic violence, and child sexual abuse 
cases, did not get the result they hoped for in Giles. However, there is 
some substantial room left for forfeiture to operate occasionally in 
homicide prosecutions and more frequently in domestic violence and 
child abuse cases. The forfeiture doctrine would have its impact despite 
Giles’s intent requirement through trial court findings of intent to 
discourage testimony by the witness, who is most often the crime victim 
in forfeiture cases. 
Davis drew a distinction between statements that are covered by the 
testimonial concept because they are efforts by the police to gather facts 
about past events in a nonemergency situation and those excluded from 
Confrontation Clause coverage because they were made during an on-
going emergency.65 On the facts in Davis, the Court ruled that the 
emergency had ended when the accused left the victim’s home.66 
64 Indeed, in his contribution to this symposium, Professor Davies notes that the 
focus on testimonial statements gets the understanding of the law at the time of the 
framing backward. Non-formal statements were even more clearly rejected than were 
those which would be categorized as testimonial today. See Thomas Y. Davies, Selective 
Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’ Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or 
Were Not “Established at the Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 664–66 
(2009). 
65 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  
66 Id. at 828–29. “In this case, for example, after the operator gained the 
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears 
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However, the Court did not fault the nontestimonial treatment of 
statements identifying the perpetrator when made as part of a 
communication that was otherwise focused on the emergency.67 It ruled 
that the fact that the perpetrator left the victim’s location together with 
the investigative-type questions that were being asked by the 9-1-1 
operator at that point rendered the statements testimonial.68 However, 
there is no definitive indication that the Court established the 
perpetrator’s departure as a rigid litmus test of when the emergency 
ended, nor did it rule that testimonial status depended on any particular 
fact.  
As a consequence, substantial discretion has been given to trial 
judges to determine by factual construction of the emergency or 
nonemergency nature of the situation the testimonial character of 
statements, particularly when the statements are made shortly after a 
domestic assault. I have no definitive data, but I believe trial courts have 
taken the opportunity to rule nontestimonial a substantial number of 
statements made after the domestic violence has ended by finding that 
the period of the emergency was on-going.69 While Davis clearly made 
to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told 
McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily 
be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry’s statements were testimonial, not 
unlike the ‘structured police questioning’ that occurred in Crawford.” Id. (quoting 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004)). 
67 Id. at 827. “[T]he nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again 
viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to 
resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had 
happened in the past. That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the 
identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they 
would be encountering a violent felon.” Id. 
68 Id. at 828–29. 
69 See, e.g., Vinson v. State, 221 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding on-
going emergency on facts quite similar to those in Hammon v. Indiana, the 
companion case to Davis (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–27)); Andrew Dylan, Note, 
Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1905, 1926 (2007). “One commentator has argued for an aggressive expansion of the 
emergency concept: ‘Davis can easily be interpreted to make every single surrounding 
circumstance, known or unknown, possibly associated with the statement itself 
relevant in deciding emergency versus prosecutorial.’ No court has explicitly 
announced its support for such an expansive view of the ongoing emergency concept, 
but under the open-ended language of Davis, the trial courts seem to have wide 
leeway in determining the scope of the ongoing emergency test. 
 “Rather than taking a clear theoretical stand, most courts applying the ongoing 
emergency test simply delve directly into some form of fact-intensive inquiry and then 
announce their results. Often, despite Davis’s admonition that the existence of the 
ongoing emergency must be determined objectively, the lower courts will base their 
determinations on the subjective perceptions of either the declarant or the 
interviewer who was at the scene.” Id.  
 Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has argued for a systemically broad concept of 
emergency in the domestic violence context because of the character of the abusive 
relationship. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2007); 
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domestic violence cases more difficult to prosecute successfully by 
excluding some 9-1-1 calls and many communications with first 
responders, the Supreme Court gave lower courts some flexibility in 
shaping the dimensions of testimonial statements through their role as 
fact finder, and this authority has resulted in fact-based contraction of 
the scope of Confrontation Clause coverage. 
Similarly, in Giles, the Supreme Court recognized that a pattern of 
abuse might support a finding that the defendant did intend by his 
violence to silence the victim. The Court stated: 
 Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim 
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to 
prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal 
prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in 
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime 
expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from 
reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal 
prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the 
forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to 
dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly 
relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal 
proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to 
testify.70 
Justice Souter stated in his concurring opinion that: 
 [the historical materials demonstrate no]. . . reason to doubt that 
the element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent 
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive 
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the 
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this 
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing 
defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the 
instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.71 
Given Breyer’s statement for three other Justices that forfeiture exists 
automatically in the homicide case, every Justice adopted at least the 
position that a pattern of abuse can result in a finding of intent to silence 
the victim as a witness in homicide cases.72  
Although the Supreme Court’s discussion focused on an abusive 
situation that ended in homicide, nothing in the Court’s rationale would 
prohibit its application where a pattern of violence ends in a violent 
assault and the living victim fails to cooperate in the prosecution or to 
appear at trial. Evidence of a pattern of conduct that prompts the loss of 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of 
Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
70 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008). 
71 Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at 2696–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the victim’s testimony would also qualify under the forfeiture 
requirement of Giles since that showing would satisfy the intent 
requirement. Although this is a more limited fact-based exception than 
the continuing emergency of Davis, it is a real and potentially significant 
one. 
In child abuse cases, a showing of intent to silence the witness is also 
possible if caused by threats that victims sometime report abusers have 
made to them. As I noted in an earlier Article, occasionally one finds in 
published cases that “the perpetrator has warned the child not to reveal 
the information, and occasionally children will understand that ‘telling 
on’ the perpetrator will get him into trouble.”73 Some scholars contend 
that such threats are frequent in child sexual abuse cases.74 It may be that 
forfeiture will rarely be at issue because most statements in sexual abuse 
cases will be considered nontestimonial under a narrow construction of 
the doctrine that includes virtually only those statements made to law 
enforcement investigators. However, if the statements are found to be 
testimonial,75 this fact-based forfeiture argument that the child was 
intimidated into silence will be available, if established by the facts,76 to 
support forfeiture of confrontation rights.77  
73 Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 946.  
74 See Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1017, 1068–70 (2000) (discussing threats and inducements that perpetrators
use in an attempt to discourage the child from reporting the abuse (citing JUDITH 
LEWIS HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 88 (1981) (noting that many of the incest
victims interviewed reported threats that included the warning that their fathers
would be put in jail if it were reported); and BARBARA E. SMITH & SHARON GORETSKY 
ELSTEIN, THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES: FINAL REPORT
93 (1993) (describing threats not to reveal abuse included both warnings of physical
violence against the child or others and “pleas that the abuser would get into trouble
if the child told”))).
75 Under these circumstances, the statement should be admitted because of 
forfeiture but not because it is a nontestimonial statement if the trial court properly 
considers the child’s purpose in making the statement. The threat by the perpetrator 
should cement the child’s understanding that reporting the information will have 
serious consequences, such as prosecuting the perpetrator, and establishes a 
testimonial intent by the child. See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, 
at 946. However, many courts almost categorically exclude statements made to private 
individuals or focus on the primary purpose of the questioner, which with most early 
conversations will usually be the welfare of the child when the person asking the 
question is not a government investigator. 
76 Not all such evidence will be sufficient. In In re Rolandis G., the Illinois 
Supreme Court found that a “pinky swear” not to tell anyone else about the oral sex 
act obtained by an eleven-year old accused by a six-year old male victim was not 
sufficiently directed at a future trial to constitute forfeiture under Giles. In re Rolandis, 
902 N.E.2d 600, 616 (Ill. 2008). Whether the result would have been different in this 
court’s opinion if an adult abuser had threatened physical violence if the abuse were 
revealed is unclear. My point is not that the evidence will always be sufficient, but 
promises of this sort or threats as part of the sex act provide a basis for argument 
regarding Giles forfeiture that is distinct from the rejected position that forfeiture 
2009] AVOIDING DAMAGE TO CRAWFORD’S REVOLUTION 695 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In my first article after Crawford was decided, I took the position that 
the confrontation right should be broadly interpreted and the forfeiture 
right should be narrowly construed.78 My point was not that the new right 
should or could become a “get-out-of-jail-free card” for the defendants. 
My response to the prospect of massive jail delivery and a windfall to 
guilty defendants in the exclusion of testimony was to encourage 
confrontation rather than to avoid it by finding a forfeiture of the right. I 
am particularly supportive of that result with children, where I believe 
successful efforts to make children comfortable in the courtroom leads to 
fulfillment of the confrontation right, often to successful testimony, and 
sometimes to empowered children.  
Certainly the result in Davis’s companion case Hammon v. Indiana 
was a blow to domestic violence prosecutions, but had it decided that an 
interview one hour after the violence, with police officers on the scene 
and the situation secure, was not testimonial, the blow to the 
confrontation right would have been devastating across a broad range of 
criminal cases. I believe similarly that, although Giles is also a blow to 
domestic violence prosecutions, the opposite—that forfeiture did not 
require an intent to silence the witness, which would not have been 
confined to the limited class of homicide cases—would have been 
devastating to maintaining the integrity of the new Confrontation Clause 
system. Pressures are great to find exceptions to its rigors. Easy forfeiture 
could gut the right in entire classes of cases and statements. Such a result 
could be particularly unfortunate given how narrowly the testimonial 
statement concept is being interpreted. 
My clear perception is that lower courts are generally interpreting 
the new confrontation right quite narrowly under the testimonial 
concept.79 I assume that rather consistent pattern of conservative 
interpretation of scope of the right will continue. We are well on our way 
to developing a useful, if unnecessarily narrow, Confrontation Clause. 
cannot be found simply by a judicial decision that the defendant committed a violent 
crime or sexual abuse against the victim-declarant. 
77 Of course, the prosecution must overcome the defense argument that 
forfeiture is illogical because the child was obviously not intimidated from reporting 
by the perpetrator’s threat. Given that fact, the argument goes, there is no reason to 
believe the victim failed to testify because of that ineffectual threat. Any renewed 
threats would clearly overcome this argument, and perhaps expert psychological 
testimony could provide another basis for finding that the much earlier threat 
ultimately had its intended effect.  
78 See Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 29, at 519 (describing an 
approach that favors a broad definition of the testimonial concept, limits forfeiture, 
and encourages confrontation rather than exclusion). 
79 See generally Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not 
Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 
166 (2006) (finding lower court opinions consistently conservative in interpreting the 
potentially expansive testimonial statement doctrine). 
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Giles, like Davis, avoided certain grave injury to the right, but nothing in 
those opinions renews the revolutionary feel of Crawford in the heady 
days immediately after the decision when its scope was potentially quite 
broad and retrenchment had not yet begun.80 
80 The testimonial concept was then so potentially broad that one possible 
definition was “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial” and so undefined that the Court listed three possible general definitions. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae 
the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)). 
